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The instant case nevertheless pursues the modem trend toward
29 It
stricter liability evidenced in the field of automobile accidents.
presents practitioners with a potent means of avoiding the defenses
of unavoidable accident and of contributory negligence in factual
situations of this type. Once a wrongful entry is established, a member of the landowner's household may bring trespass to the person
for injuries resulting from the trespass to land. On the other hand, a
physically harmed landowner himself may bring trespass quare
clausum fregit and allege his injuries by way of aggravation. In either
event, by virtue of the combination of trespass to the person and
trespass to land, the absence of negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory negligence of the plaintiff are both ruled
out as possible defenses.
V. Monms SMaT, JR.
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or EQurry. By Zechariah Chafee, Jr. Ann Arbor.

University of Michigan Law School. 1950. Pp. xiv, 380, table of
cases and index. $4.50.
Today much attention is being focused on procedural reform to the
end that a more expeditious justice may be made available for all.
But the law needs more than to be expedited. A juster justice, geared
to the social needs of our time, should be included in any program of
law reform. In past centuries equity was the principal engine for the
reform of the substantive law of the English legal system. But of
recent years the tendency has been to leave substantive reform to
legislation, and many of the tools of equity have become dulled by
the accumulated scale of rules long since outmoded.
In the series of lectures reprinted in Some Problems of Equity,
Professor Chafee, who in former years almost singlehandedly brought
about the modernization of interpleader, brings the hone of his pragmatic mind to bear on a number of other weapons of equity and
points the way toward refurbishing them for more useful service in
the hands of today's jurists.
2

0See James, Accident Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALz L. J. 549 (1948), and cases therein cited.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol4/iss1/18

2

Maloney: Some Problems of Equity
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
For purposes of examination the book may be conveniently divided
into four parts. The first part, consisting of the first three chapters,
deals with the clean-hands maxim. After careful analysis, Professor
Chafee comes to the conclusion that this supposed general equitable
principle is not peculiar to equity but ". . . is really a bundle of
rules relating to quite diverse subjects, [and] that insofar as it is a
principle it is not very helpful but is at times capable of causing
considerable harm" (p. 2). He finds it used in eighteen different
types of suits, running the gamut from protection of copyrights to
matrimonial litigation, and recommends a functional approach to these
various types of proceedings as the only method of adequately understanding its application to the various fact situations analyzed.
Professor Chafee concludes that the maxim has often done harm in
the past by making courts oversensitive to the ethical conduct of the
complainant, and that, especially in matrimonial suits, it should be
replaced by a sort of pragmatic balancing of the social policies involved. The Florida doctrine of mutual recrimination,' under which
a divorce may be granted to the less guilty of two "unclean" spouses,
is a step in this direction.
Chafee's rejection of the clean-hands doctrine in the matrimonial
cases does not necessarily mean that it should be done away with
entirely. The real culprit in many of the cases he cites is not the
clean-hands doctrine itself but the fact that the courts have used it
as an easy out to avoid getting into the larger issues at stake. What
is needed is not the rejection of the clean-hands maxim but rather a
more liberal application of the doctrine in the light of all of the ends
of justice in the particular case - a balancing of social interests in the
sense of Dean Pound,2 with the interest in the general morals included
in its proper perspective along with the other social interests involved.
Professor Chafee himself does not completely reject the clean-hands
doctrine, but rather recommends a shift in emphasis from that maxim,
which relates to past transgressions, to the maxim that "he who seeks
equity must do equity," which looks to the future instead of the past.
This shift would allow relief in many cases in which an uncritical
application of the clean-hands doctrine would result in its denial, and
seems desirable provided that care is taken to see that no future
wrongdoing is thereby sanctioned.
The second major subdivision of the book deals with another
'See
Note, 1 U. OF FLA. L. 11Ev. 62 (1948), for an analysis of this doctrine.
2
See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HAnv. L. 1,Ev. 1 (1948).
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equitable maxim, that "equity follows the law." This part of the book
is a reprint of a law review article first published in 1926. Here
Professor Chafee argues for a relaxation in the application of the
maxim to allow for growth of the law of torts through the granting of
equitable relief in the case of new torts not yet recognized as actionable on the law side of the court. If this course is followed, he
anticipates the development of equitable protection against injuries
to personality even in the absence of the recognition of a law action
for damages for injury caused by such invasion. It is interesting to
note that in the interval since this article was first written the reverse
development has taken place in Florida, which now allows an action
for damages for invasion of the right of privacy3 but has not yet
recognized the injunction as a means of protecting this right. The
general principles advanced in this section, however, still seem eminently sound.
The third subdivision of the book, consisting of Chapters 5 through
7, deals with multiple-party suits and sets forth Professor Chafee's
recommendations for modernizing multiple-party procedure. Chapter
5, again a reprint of an earlier law review article, deals with bills of
peace and the artificial limitations, such as the requirement of
"privity," that were placed on them during their early development.
The author strips off these limitations and finds at bottom that the
basic issue is a conflict between the policy of guaranteeing a jury
trial in cases involving issues such as negligence or title to land, and
the policy of avoiding multiple actions through consolidation in equity.
For Chafee the avoidance of multiple suits is of itself sufficient to
confer equitable jurisdiction, and overrides the constitutional guarantee of a jury trial; the problem then becomes a pragmatic one of
balancing the value of a jury trial against the economy of time and
expense gained through consolidation through the bill of peace.
Chapters 6 and 7 deal with another type of multiple-party suit, the
class suit, in which the adjudication becomes binding on all members
of the class, whether they actually participate in the suit or not. Here
Chapter 6 deals with the historical development of the remedy and
the problem of notice to unnamed members of the class, and Chapter
7 provides an analysis of Federal Rule 23 governing representative
suits in the federal courts. Here Professor Chafee's objection to the
rigid categories of class suits set up in Rule 23 strikes at the weak
SCason v. Basldn, 155 Fla. 198, 20 So.2d 243 (1944); Cason v. Baskin, 159
. 276.
Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 653 (1947); see 21 FA.
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point in the rule. If his suggestions for improvement were adopted, a
much more workable rule would result.
The final part of the work, consisting of the last two chapters, deals
with the problem of whether lack of "equity jurisdiction" makes an
erroneously issued decree void or merely voidable, a problem that
seriously concerned Mr. John L. Lewis a few short years ago. Chafee
admits as the'traditional view that a court, even though possessed of
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the suit, still
lacks power to grant equitable relief unless the complainant has a
valid reason for coming into equity. But he advocates the opposite
view, namely, that in jurisdictions where law and equity are merged
the court, if it has jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties,
can render a decree that is valid and that must be obeyed until set
aside, even though the court lacks "equity jurisdiction" and hence is
acting erroneously. Applied to the United Mine Workers case of
1947, 4 Chafee argues, this approach would have clarified an extremely
confusing opinion in which the majority held Lewis in contempt for
failing to obey a decree that the same majority considered possibly
void, the principle enunciated being that even void decrees must be
obeyed until reversed unless the question of jurisdiction is "frivolous
and not substantial."
Chafee admits that to make his approach workable it would be
necessary to establish some new provision for speedy review on the
question of equity jurisdiction in cases involving what he would
classify as voidable decrees. Until such expeditious review is provided for, however, most courts will probably continue to classify such
decrees as void, so that a speedy review may be had through the writ
of habeas corpus after a defendant violates a decree he believes to be
unlawful and is committed for contempt of court. Chafee's proposed
solution would do much to cut down the disrespect for law and order
fostered by the present method of testing objectionable decrees by
disobedience.
This review has been necessarily overlong because Some Problems
of Equity, being a series of lectures and articles, lacks a single focus.
But the book is a stimulating and thought-provoking one in which the
author, by applying to various equitable concepts the pragmatic test
of their usefulness to contemporary society, makes a valuable contribution toward the modernization and integration of present-day equity
in the American system of law. While aiming at this serious goal,
4United

States v. U.M.W. of America, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
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Professor Chafee preserves a sparkling sense of humor rarely found
in a work of this type. The book is in no sense a practitioners manual,
but it is heartily recommended to any lawyer who, to quote from the
dedication, has not "let practice deaden his eager interest in theory
and has so placed the windows of the mind that he can watch the
charted courses of the law and turning gaze at the open sea.
FRANK E. MA ONEY
Associate Professorof Law, University of Florida

D~morRucy Am T= INivmu~A. By Carleton Kemp Allen.* London
and New York: Oxford University Press. Second Impression 1945.
Pp. 103. $1.25.
Here is a book that appeared several years ago and is perhaps
more timely today. It is an excellent brief refutation of the superficial analysis of democracy in Mr. Justice Douglas' article "Democracy
Charts Its Course."' Doctor Allen's thoughts contained in this little
volume are worth reading not for their meager philosophic content
but for the light they shed on such matters as "Democracy," "The
Majority Principle' and "Universal Suffrage."
In principle, government is a necessary evil. There is very little
about these difficult questions of which we can be sure. But for
the Western world we can, I think, be sure that the individual is
all-important, that the State is made for man and not man for the
State, Hobbes, Hitler and Stalin to the contrary notwithstanding.
Liberty, however, is relative, and where the line shall be drawn is
debatable. We can also be sure that justice, though hard to define,
must be the ideal for which as civilized people we will continue to
strive; therefore we reject the Holmesian idea of force which would
degrade us to the level of the beasts. Our justice should take the
form of uniform laws impartially administered.
Though the word "democracy" is much in use, it cannot be
accurately defined, and at most it seems to mean opposition to
autocratic rule. It is a state of mind rather than a clear and formulated definition. We must cease to think of it as having any godlike
or magical basis or as being the permanent form of government, for
*Barrister-at-law; formerly Professor of Jurisprudence, Oxford University.
1U.or Fr". L.REv. 133 (1948).
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